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RETIREMENT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS AND 
COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG* 
This paper presents evidence that a trade-olf exists between wages and cer-
tain characteristics of retirement systems in the public sector. Cross-section 
econometric estimates for uniformed municipal employees, based upon data 
from iwo national surveys of municipalities, suggest that, other things equal, 
an increase in the contribution made by uniformed employees to their retire-
ment system leads to a compensating increase in their salaries, while retire-
ment systems with more "generous" characteristics are associated lo some ex-
tent with lower salaries. The estimates also indicate that the extent of retire-
ment system underfunding is related to employers' and employees' percep-
tions of the probability that promised retirement benefits will not be fully 
paid and that these perceptions too are reflected in compensating wage 
differentials. The author concludes (hat pension reform legislation in the 
public sector will be likely to have an impact on public sector wages and, 
therefore, careful consideration should be given to the design of such legisla-
tion. 
IN 1974, Congress passed a major piece of private sector pension reform legislation, 
the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA). ERISA was designed to in-
crease the probability that private sector 
employees receive pensions. It included 
provisions requiring liberalized vesting 
rules, more stringent funding requirements, 
*Tlic author is a professor of economics and indus-
trialand labor iclationsatCornell University, Research 
support was provided by the National Science Founda-
tion and much of die cLitatiscdin (lie paper was provid-
ed by the International City Management Association. 
Seminars based upon earlier versions ol thispaper were 
presented at several workshops. The author is grateful 
to Alan Marcus and David Rogers for their research 
assistance and to Edward Laiear and Robert S, Smith 
for their comments. 
and increased fiduciary responsibility. The 
need for, and wisdom of, ERISA-type con-
trols over public employees' retirement 
systems is currently under debate.1 
Unfortunately, as with many other gov-
ernment regulations, public sector pension 
reform legislation would likely have unin-
tended side effects.2 Btcause ERISA-type 
'The recent publication of U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Pen-
sion Task Force Report on Public Employee Retire-
ment Systems (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1978), 
which contains a survey of state and local govern-
ment retirement system characteristics, has added 
further fuel to the debate. 
That ERISA itself had many "unintended" side 
effects is now widely recognized and studies of the 
act's quantitative impact onavaiiety of areas are cur-
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 33, No. 4 (July 1980), © 1980 by Cornell University, 
0019-7939/8O/3SO4-O470J00.75 
470 
Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
Copyright (c) Cornell University 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G, Retirement System Characteristics and Compensating Wage Differentials 
in the Public Sector, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 33:4(1980:July) p.470 
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controls inaease costs of providing pen-
sions, one would expect governments to 
shift at least part of the increased costs to 
their employees in the form of lower wages, 
To the extent that the costs are not fully 
shifted, one would also expect lower levels 
of public employment and increased costs of 
public services(in the form of higher taxes).' 
Hence, it is not obvious a priori that such 
legislation is socially desirable. As a prelude 
to a more complete evaluation of the desir-
ability of public sector pension reform legis-
lation, this paper seeks toascertain if a trade-
off exists between retirement system char-
acteristics and wages in the public sector,* 
The Trade-Off in the Public Sector 
Pension plans take many forms, but most 
can be categorized as either "defined-con-
tribution plans" or"defined-benefilplans," 
In defined-contribution plans, the amount 
of money contributed to an employee's ac-
count at each point in time is determined by 
such criteria as the employee's wage or the 
firm's profits. These contributions are in-
vested by the firm or its agent, and the em-
ployee receives noguarantee about the bene-
fit levels that will be received upon retire-
ment. Far more prevalent in the public 
sector than defined-contribution plans, 
however, are defined-benefil plans.5 In such 
rently being conducted under Department of Labor 
funding. 
'Evidence that wage elasticities of demand for public 
employees are negative is found in Orley Ashenfelter 
and Ronald C. Ehrenberg, "The Demand for Labor 
in (lie Public Sector" in Daniel I lainehncsli, ed,, 
Labor in the Public and Nonprofit Sectors (Princeton, 
N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1975), and Ronald 
C, Ehrenberg, "The Demand lor Stale and Local 
Government Employees," American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 113, No. 3 (June 1973), pp. 366 - 79. 
'Two related prior studies arc Alan Gttstman and 
Martin Segal, "Teachers Pensions: An Analysis ol 
Interstate Variations," Industrial Relations, Vol. 16, 
No. 2 (October 1977), pp. 335 -<M, and Randall Weiss 
and Bradley Schiller, "The Value of Defined Benefit 
Pension Plans: A Test ol lite Equalling Differences 
Hypothesis," Quarterly journal of Economics (forth-
coming). The former sought to identify the reasons for 
interstate differences in teachers' pensions; the lauer 
focused on the tradeoff between private sector wages 
and pension plan characteristics. 
'Robert Tilove, Public Employee Pension Funds 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). Why 
defined benefit plans predominate is an issue that is 
plans, the worker is guaranteed a pension of 
a given amount per year upon retirement. 
The benefit level is often a function of one 
or more factors, such as an employee's years 
of service and the wage over his or her tenure 
with the government. 
Dcfincd-bencfit pension plans are typi-
cally quite complex and contain numerous 
provisions, These include minimum age 
and/or service requirements for receipt of 
benefits upon retirement; vesting rules; 
rules that specify which salary level enters 
into the calculation of a retiree's benefits 
(final year's, average of final n years, career 
average, with or without overtime earnings, 
and so forth); required employee contribu-
tion rates to the retirement system; and a 
variety of rules that relate to special situa-
tions (such as early retirement provisions., 
disability benefit provisions, provisions for 
death benefits for death prior to retiremenl, 
and survivors' options).6 Fortunately, in 
most cases it is straightforward to calculate 
how changing a provision will alter the net 
contributions that an employer must make 
each period to an employee's pension fund, 
account in order to keep the account fully 
funded.7 For example, increasing employ-
ees' required contribution rale will decrease 
not addressed here. Undoubtedly, the phenomenon 
reflects both employees' risk aversion (preference for 
a certain nominal benefit letel) and government offi-
cials' ability to uutlerfund defined benefit plans. (See 
Gene Mumy, "The Economics of Local Go vent mem 
Pensions and Pension Funding," Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 86, No. 3 (June 1978), pp. 517-28. 
Extension of ERISA to the public sector would elimi-
nate the latter rationale. 
'Sec Tilove, Public Employee Pension Funds; U.S. 
House of Representatives, Pension Task Force Re-
port .,., and U.S. Conference of Mayors, Labor Man-
agement Relations Service (prepared by Edward H. 
Friend 8: Co.), Third National Survey of Employee 
Benefits for Full-Time Personnel of U.S, Munici-
palities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Conference of May-
ors, 1977), for a more complete description o( the 
various provisions and the frequency with which dicy 
occur. 
'Details ot the methodology used in these calcula-
tions arc found in Burt S. Darnow and Ronald G. 
Ehrenberg, T h e Costs of Defined Benelil Pension 
Plans and Firm Adjustments," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 93, No. 1 (November 1979), pp. 523 -
40, in which explicit employer net pension cost func-
tions for several stylized definecl-bencfit pension 
plans are derived. 
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472 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
the employer's net pension costs, while 
increasing the generosity of the plan by 
increasing the level of retirement benefits 
that are received for each year of service will 
increase the employer's net pension costs, 
ceteris paribus. In general, the required 
employer net pension fund contribution per 
employee each period (C) will be a function 
of the employee's current wage rate (W) 
and of a vector (R) of retirement system char-
acteristics, 
(I) C = C{W,R) 
Previous studies of public sector wage 
determination have shown that variations 
in wage scales of public employees across 
cities can be explained by a vector of vari-
ables, X, which represent the determinants 
of the demand for, and supply of, public 
employees in a city, the extent of power of 
public employee unions, the extent of the 
local government's monopsony power, and 
the structure of the local government (as, 
for example, mayor-council or city man-
ager),8 Suppose that public employers arc 
indifferent as to how their total labor costs 
are divided between wages and retirement 
system contributions; this will occur if each 
dollar that public employers devote to wages 
has the same impact on labor turnover, 
turnover costs, and employee productivity 
as each dollar that they devote to retirement 
system contributions.' Under such condi-
•See Ronald G, Ehrenberg, "Municipal Govern-
ment Structure, Unionization, and the Wages o( Fire-
fighters," Industrial and Labor Relations Utoiew, 
Vol. 27, No. I (October 1973), pp. 36-48, and Ronald 
C. Ehrenberg and Gerald S. Goldstein, "A Model of 
Public Sector Wage Determinat ion,'' Journal of Urban 
Economics, Vol. 2, No. I (February 1975),p(>, 223 -<15. 
This assumption ignores the effect of deferred 
compensation schemes on life-cycle productivity 
growth (see Edward Laicar, "Why Is There Mandatory 
Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, 
No. 6 (November-December 1979), pp. 126-85}, the 
effects ol tax treatment of pension contributions (see 
Donald Gymroi, 'The Effect of Tax Incentives on the 
Rate of Return for Private Pensions" (paper presented 
at the August 1978 Econometric Society Meetings)), 
and the possible effects of retirement system param-
eters perse on labor turnover (see Jack Whiting, "Com-
pensating Wage Differentials and Pension Coverage" 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1979)). 
Whether these omissions are justified is an empirical 
question. Once the notion that employees have 
"permanent" attachments to a government is iniro-
tions, the division of the compensation 
package between wages and nonwage l?bor 
costs (defined here for expository purposes 
to include only net pension contributions) 
would be determined by employee prefer-
ences, and wages would adjust across cities 
with identical characteristics (X) to equalize 
the total costs of public employees. Hence, 
(2) W(X,R) + C(W,R) = W(X). 
A 
Here W represents the wage scale func-
tion for public employees in cities without 
public employee retirement systems and W 
the function in cities with retirement sys-
tems, It immediately follows that for any 
retirement system provision fi,-, 
(3) W/oRi = 
-(dC/cRi)/(l +(8C/9Wr)). 
Since increases in public employee wage 
scales never reduce public employers' net 
pension fund liabilities per employee 
( JC/ 31C 2 1), changing any retirement 
system provision in a manner that increases 
employers' net pension fund liabilities per 
employee will lead to a reduction in public 
employees' wage scales. That is, other 
things equal, public employers with more 
generous pension plans will pay lower 
wages than public employers with less gen-
erous, or no, pension plans. Holding the 
characteristics of cities (X) constant, market 
observations on public sector wages and 
retirement system characteristics would 
trace out the trade-off curve for municipal 
employers. 
Clearly, this is a simplification. As Sher-
win Rosen lias superbly demonstrated, the 
observable market trade-off is a reduced 
form determined by the interaction of both 
employers' and employees' preferences. To 
identify the underlying structural model 
and estimate the implicit demand and sup-
ply "prices" of pension coverage would re-
quire a more detailed model (hat would 
include the roles of risk, tax treatment of 
pensions, differential rates of return on 
duced, one may argue that Equation 2 below should 
be replaced by a weaker expression that involves 
present values. As a result, the empirical work re-
ported in Table l also includes present value equa-
tions. 
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governmental and individual investments, 
economies of scale in group provision of 
annuities, and the differential impact of 
pensions on turnover and turnover on pro-
ductivity across cities.10 Sadly, the available 
data do not permit me to identify the under-
lying structural equations that would be 
generated from such a model. As such, al-
though I "maintain" the fiction that I am 
estimating the parameters of the employer 
trade-off curve to derive testable implica-
tions, it should be understood that I am 
actually estimating reduced-form market 
equilibrium equations below. 
Empirical Analysis: 1973 Survey Data 
Based upon the analytic framework pre-
sented in the previous section, I specify esti-
mating equations of the form 
(4) »ty = ai + aiX/+a,rt,-+u/ 
Here Wij represents the logarithm of 
the wage scale (entrance or maximum) of 
public employees in category i (police or 
firefighters) in city ;', X, is a vector of vari-
ables expected to influence the wages of 
public employees in city ;', Rj is a vector of 
characteristics of the public employees' 
retirement system in city ;, otj and a8 are 
vectors of coefficients, «o is the intercept 
term, and u/isa random error term. Variants 
of Equation 4 are estimated in this section 
using 1973 cross-section data on police and 
firefighters in cities with populations 
greater than 50,000. The data used in the 
analyses come Irom the micro data files 
underlying the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1972 County and City Data Book (Washing-
ton, D.C.: G.P.O., 1973), and the Inter-
national City Management Association, 
"1973 Survey of Personnel Policies in Muni-
l
°Sec Sherwin Rwen, "Hedonk Prices and Implicit 
Markets," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, 
No. I (January-February 197-1), pp. 31-55.1 should 
stress that I do consider the lole ot risk of nonpayment 
of benefits laier in this paper. Recently, Robert E. 
Lucas, "Hcdonic Wage Equations and Psychic Wages 
in the Returns lo School," American Economic Re-
view, Vol, 67, No. 4 (September 1977), pp. 549-58, 
and Whiting, "Compensating Wage Differentials," 
have utilized Rosen's approach to analyze the trade-
offs between wages and nonpecuniary job charac-
teristics and between private sector wages and pension 
plan characteristics. 
cipal Police and Fire Departments." 
The X, are drawn from those variables 
that have been shown to influence public 
sector wages in previous studies of public 
sector wage determination," These include 
a measure of union power, the form of mu-
nicipal government, and a set of socio-
demographic and economic variables that 
represent the determinants of the fiscal 
capacity of a municipality, the relative pref-
erences of a community for various public 
services, and alternative wages in the private 
sector, As with previous studies, the X, do 
not include any measures of the "quality" 
of municipal employees in a city; these data 
are unfortunately not available. To the 
extent that municipalities that offer high 
wages and generous retirement benefits can 
attract better applicants, and consequently 
higher quality employees, the omission of 
any "quality" variables may bias the esti-
mates of the coefficients of the retirement 
system characteristics away from finding 
evidence of any compensating differentials. 
The available retirement system charac-
teristics in this first data set include whether 
police and firefighters belong to the same 
retirement system, whether the uniformed 
employees' retirement system is distinct 
from the system for other municipal em-
ployees, whether a compulsory retirement 
age exists, the minimum age an employee 
must attain to be eligible for regular retire-
ment benefits, the percentage of salary that 
retirees receive for minimum regular retire-
ment benefits, and the employees' retire-
ment contributions as a fraction of their 
annual salary. While the first three retire-
ment system characteristics are included 
primarily as controls, the latter three di-
rectly affect employers' net pension costs. It 
is straightforward lo show that, ceteris pari-
bus, an increase in the retirement age or the 
employees' contribution rate reduces em-
ployers' net pension costs and an increase in 
the plan's generosity increases it,12 
Estimates of variants of Equation 4 that 
utilize the logarithms of annual police 
patrolmen and firefighters' entrance (W[) 
"See, tor example, the studies cited in footnote 8. 
"See Barnow and Ehrenberg, "The Costs of De-
fined Benefit...". 
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Table 1. The Impact of Retirement System Parameters on 
Uniformed Employees Earnings: All Systems/ 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
trtttfjiftidfitf 
Variables 
* i 
xt 
X* 
X
 ( 
* 5 
x« 
X , 
It, 
" l 
*s 
«,
b 
" l 
-.097 
(017) 
.029 
(.010) 
.185* 
(.070) 
.107* 
(.039) 
.352* 
(.055) 
.286* 
(.055) 
.071* 
(.01B) 
.015 
(.009) 
.011* 
(.000) 
.050* 
(.018) 
.001 
(.024) 
-.00-1* 
(JKI) 
.070 
(.203) 
IWirr 
" 1 
-Ml** 
(.018) 
.033** 
(.018) 
,210* 
(.074) 
.170* 
(.(HI) 
.Ml* 
(.058) 
.28) 
(.069) 
.088* 
(.019) 
.048* 
(.010) 
.001* 
(.000) 
.023 
(.019) 
-.008 
(.OK) 
-.003 
(.002) 
.111 
(-215) 
IV 
-.000 
(.017) 
.017* 
(017) 
.MS* 
(-072) 
.183* 
(.039) 
.321* 
(,05fi) 
.299* 
(.067) 
,084* 
(.019) 
.012* 
(.010) 
,001* 
(.000) 
.023 
(.019) 
.00S 
(.023) 
-.0OS* 
(J001) 
.000 
(.002) 
IV | 
.020 
(.010) 
.037* 
(.017) 
,I8U* 
(.070) 
.07(i* 
(.039) 
.381* 
(.051) 
.370* 
(.067) 
.05-1* 
(.017) 
.020* 
(Oil) 
,002* 
(.000) 
.037* 
(.018) 
.059* 
1.026) 
-.003* 
(.001) 
.013 
(.187) 
«t 
-.002 
(.017) 
.050* 
(.017) 
.256* 
(.071) 
,088* 
(.039) 
.279* 
(.051) 
.390* 
(.067) 
.017* 
(.017) 
.028* 
(•Oil) 
.001* 
(.000) 
.032 
(.018) 
,073* 
(.026) 
-.003* 
(.001) 
-.147 
(.180) 
Firtfigkttt 
If 1 
,102* 
(.022) 
.0B3* 
(.022) 
.261* 
(.095) 
.079 
(.053) 
.316* 
(.073) 
.320* 
(.090) 
.011 
(.023) 
.011 
(.OH) 
.003* 
(.000) 
.019 
(.(KM) 
,085* 
(.035) 
-.003 
(.002) 
.131 
(.251) 
A 
.073* 
(.022) 
,090* 
(.022) 
.330* 
(.093) 
.091** 
(.051) 
.211* 
(.071) 
.239* 
(.088) 
.001 
(.023) 
.019 
(.OH) 
.002* 
(.000) 
.013 
(.02-1) 
.100* 
(.031) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.029 
(-217) 
I'V 
.007 
(.018) 
.039* 
(.017) 
.272* 
(.074) 
.078** 
(.012) 
.283* 
(.058) 
.282* 
(.072) 
.054* 
(.019) 
.023* 
(.011) 
.002* 
(.000) 
.022 
(.020) 
.078* 
(.028) 
- .002* 
(.001) 
.001 
(.002) 
"Detinitionol variables: 
A' 1 I * finniii] parity agreement (or police and firelighters; 0 = mine 
K'i I - wagesdetermined l>y forma! union negotiations;0 = noi 
X l logarithm of median family income in 1969 
X^ logarithm of median-value otiiicr-ucctijticd troincs in 1913 
X;, logarithm of average hourly earnings of manufacturing production workers in 1969(co,uals«™if not legated) 
X a \ - average hourly earnings not tc|>orlcd; 0 = otherwise 
X j I = city-manager form o! government; 0 •= odierwisc 
X » logarithm of 1969 ixipidation 
X <} 1969 imputation denrily 
/(I I = police and firefighters' retirement systems are die same; 0 = otlienvisc 
/(a I * com|Hilsoiy retirement age exists; 0 = otherwise 
/(,i minimum age for regular retirement in 1973 
It 4 minimum years service (or regular retirement in 1973 
If if If 2) logarithm o( annual police nalrol men or firefighters' cm ranee (maximum) salary in 1973 
If [(1^2) logariihtn o( annual \m\ict jKilrolmcn or firefighters'cnliaiicc (maximum) salary in 1973 tier'10 hour workweek 
I'V logarithm of present value of earnings, flic prescm value of earnings was calculated by assuming etnia) annual 
increments between the minimum aiHl maximum wage scale during the number of years it takes to teach die 
maximum in a city, a 25 year horizon, and a 10% discount rale. The results were invariant to choice of horiion (25 
or 30 years) or discount rate (0,5, or 10%). The number of observations in equations using these variables wits 
smaller than in other equations because some cities did not report data on lite number of years it lakes to teach 
their maximum salaries. 
*C<iefficieniissipificantlydiIterenifromieroatlhe.0Slevelofsignificanccwilhaiwo-iai1cdicst. 
'•Coefficient is significantly different (romieroal tlie, lOttvclof significance with a two-tailed lest, 
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Tabic 1. (Continued) 
liidtjirnitrnl 
VatiMcs 
Police Fitefighttr 
I ;»e 11 ' i I'V 
«,* - .135" 
(.078) 
.063' 
(.025) 
.285* 
(-11*) 
.723 
- . 1 7 1 * 
(.082) 
.055* 
(.026) 
.3)7* 
(.125) 
.727 
m 
- . 09? 
(.088) 
.001* 
(.026) 
.307* 
(.117) 
.733 
131 
.035 
(.087) 
.010 
(.(KM) 
1.2HS* 
(.4-10) 
.J 12 
101 
,060 
(.087) 
.0)2 
(.02-I) 
1.63-1* 
(.015) 
.717 
101 
.157 
(.117) 
- .00 ( 
(.032) 
1.177* 
(.597) 
.G5B 
101 
.191 
(JM) 
- .002 
{.03-1) 
1.528* 
(.581) 
.668 
161 
.006 
(.099) 
.017 
1.790* 
(.«>) 
.7l.f> 
MS 
«« 
It 
[H-tn-magf ol salary retirees icccivr lor minimum regular wiiri-mciu as of 1973 
I -|K»lire(<)r(irclLfilHors|rctirfiii('riis^i('inisdilfcre)H(romtivilianiw<;n)rta'i)i('iii)>l<»vm,svi,(iii;H=<Hli(-iii-iu' 
j |)»1i«.' {ur firelighters) retirement ciimrilmiiims as a Ir.icliou of tlieir salary 
ACcK-Ilirk'iit ami Man<lartU-tT«H 1i;wc Iwcn mulliplicd by 100. 
SoMrr.rl).S. Bureau ohlw Census , /#72CmiMfyW(%^ 
CityM«ii»KtmraiAjswiaii<iti.st««7sd"^^^ 
IJSIKII data (il(s). 
and maximum (Wt) salaries, the logarithms 
of firefighters' entrance (IV,) and maximum 
(W-i) salaries per 40 hour workweek, and 
the logarithms of an estimate of the present 
value of police patrolmen and firefighters' 
annual earnings as dependent variables are 
presented in Table 1. Definitions and 
sources of all the variables are given in this 
table, which uses data from all cities over 
50,000 that reported information on wages 
and retirement system characteristics. Table 
2 presents the coefficients of the retirement 
system characteristics obtained from similar 
regressions restricted to a subset of cities in 
which the uniformed employees' retirement 
systems are distinct from the systems for 
other municipal employees. 
The coefficients of the X, variables found 
in Table 1 are of interest in tlieir own right 
and warrant brief discussion. A formal par-
ity agreement (X,) decreases the police 
annual wage, but leads to an increase in the 
firefighter annual wage (standardized for 
hours of work), Firefighters' hourly wages 
are higher in cities with union contracts 
primarily because ol the reduction in hours 
of work the unions have achieved (compare 
the coefficients of Xs in columns 4 and 5 in 
Table 1 with those in columns 6 and 7). 
While annual wages are higher in cities in 
which a city manager is the chief operating 
officer (X,), the differential vanishes for 
firefighters once we control for hours of 
work. These results are all consistent with 
previous studies of public sector wage deter-
mination, as are the coefficients of the other 
socioeconomic and demographic variables 
included in the analysis. 
In the main, when significant the signs of 
the retirement system coefficients are as 
predicted. Increasing the fraction of their 
salaries that police and firefighters con-
tribute to their retirement nystems {Ri) re-
duces municipal einployets' net pension 
costs, ceteris paribus, and does lead to an 
increase in tlieir employees' wages. The 
results in Table 1 appear to indicate thai 
firefighters are more successful than police 
in obtaining higher wages to compensate 
them for higher employee retirement con-
tributions; however, once I restrict the 
sample to uniformed employee-specific 
systems (Table 2), iheir differential success 
vanishes, Indeed, one can not reject the hy-
pothesis that police and firefighters are fully 
compensated for increased contributions 
(every one percentage point increase in their 
contribution rate leading to an increase in 
salaries of one percent) from these data. 
As expected, increases in the percentage of 
salary police receive for minimum regular 
retirement (fl5) do significantly reduce 
wages, but the relationship is insignificant 
for firefighters. In cities with a compulsory 
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Table 2, The Impact of Retirement System Parameters on 
Uniformed Employees Earnings: Uniformed Employee-Specific Systems." 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent Police Firefighter 
Variables 
ft, 
«J 
*f 
Rt 
ft, 
it1 
n 
ffi 
.005 
(.026) 
-.004* 
(.002) 
-.077 
(.251) 
-.120 
(.086) 
1.611* 
(.561) 
.690 
127 
W2 
-.014 
(.02?) 
-,002 
(.002) 
-.006 
(.258) 
-.192* 
(.089) 
2.169* 
(.577) 
.718 
127 
W| 
,050** 
(.028) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.056 
(.199) 
.113 
(.105) 
1.434* 
(.519) 
.703 
139 
U>2 
.066* 
(.028) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.223 
(.200) 
.133 
(.103) 
2.063* 
(.520) 
.719 
139 
»\ 
.078* 
(.040) 
-.003 
(.002) 
.090 
(.283) 
.212 
(.146) 
1.313** 
(.739) 
.634 
139 
wa 
.093* 
(.039) 
-,002 
(.002) 
-.076 
(.275) 
.232 
(.112) 
1,912* 
(.718) 
.651 
139 
"All ol the variables included in Table 1 were also included in each equation but, for brevity, their coefficients are 
not reported here. See Table 1 Tor variable definitions and source of data. 
b
 Coefficient and standard errors have been multiplied by 100. 
•Significant at .05 level with a two-tailed test. 
"Significant at ,10 level with a two-tailed test. 
retirement age, firefighters' wages are 
higher. While not explicitly included in my 
model, this latter result is consistent with 
the view that employers gain from such 
work rules and hence are willing to pay for 
them.13 
In contrast, the coefficient ol the mini-
mum regular retirement age variable (K3) 
is negative whenever it is statistically sig-
nificant. At first glance, this result appears 
to be inconsistent with my model. Later 
retirement ages reduce employers' net retire-
ment system contributions, ceteris paribus, 
which should lead to compensatingly 
higher wages and a positive coefficient for 
this variable. 
"An alternative rationale tor the relationship be-
tween mandatory retirement provisions and wages is 
found in Laiear, "Why fs There Mandatory Retire-
ment?" Lazear's model implies that wage growth 
should be positively associated with the existence of 
mandatory retirement provisions, Since the estimated 
percentage effects of mandatory retirement provi-
sions on firefighters' maximum salaries is greater than 
that on minimum salaries (see Tables I and 2), some 
support for his view is found here. 
I should stress, however, that the implica-
tion that public employees' retirement age 
and wage scales will be positively correlated 
was derived from a model in which retire-
ment systems were assumed to be fully 
funded and employers expected with cer-
tainty to make promised pension payments. 
In the next section, which considers the im-
pact of underlunding on the wage-pension 
trade-off in more detail, I argue that if un-
derlunding is meant to be "permanent" and 
is negatively correlated with the probability 
that promised retirement benefits will be 
fully paid rather than simply reflecting an 
intertemporal translerof pension costs, then 
employers with more fully funded systems 
would pay lower wages, ceteris paribus, 
Elsewhere I have shown that holding other 
things constant, including employers' net 
contributions to the retirement fund, a 
higher retirement age will lead to a more 
fully funded retirement system.11 Hence, a 
"Ronald C. Ehrenberg, "Correlates of Under-
funding of Public Sector Retirement Systems," Eco-
nomic Inquiry (forthcoming). 
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negative relationship is generated between 
wages and retirement ages that may well 
offset the positive relationship predicted 
by the previous model. Thus, the negative 
relationship between retirement age and 
public sector wages observed in this section 
is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
existence of a trade-off between retirement 
system characteristics and wages.15 Addi-
tional empirical evidence to support the 
"funding" hypothesis is presented below. 
The Impact of Underfunding on the 
Wage-Pension Trade-Off 
The empirical results just presented are 
based upon a model in which public em-
ployees expect to receive their promised 
pension benefits with certainty and in 
which public employers make sufficient 
contributions to retirement systems to keep 
the systems fully funded. Many public 
sector retirement systems are far from fully 
funded, however; the House Pension Task 
Force recently estimated that 75 percent of 
public employers were not funding at the 
levels required by ERISA and that the aver-
age funding deficiency was about $16,000 
per worker.16 State constitutional guaran-
tees of public employees' pension benefits 
notwithstanding, public employees may 
perceive that underfunding reduces the 
probability that they will receive some, or 
all, of their promised future retirement 
benefits.17 Consequently, they may demand 
"The negative relationship may also arise because 
of simultaneous equations bias, since many of ihc 
(actors lhat influence wages may also influence re-
tirement system parameters. A strong union, for 
example, could achieve both a high wage scale and a 
low minimum retirement age, resulting in a spurious 
negative correlation between the two variables. Un-
fortunately. the available data are not rich enough to 
provide a set of variables that can be used to identify a 
structural system in which wage and retirement system 
characteristics are simultaneously determined. This 
problem is discussed in more detail below, 
"U.S. House of Representatives, Pension Task 
Force Report,,., pp. 88-89. 
"See J. Richard Aronson, "Projections of State 
and Local Trust Fund Financing" in David Ott, eta)., 
State and Local Finances in ihe Last Half of the 1970's 
(Washington, D C : American Enterprise Institute, 
1975); Alicia Munnetl and Ann Connolly, "Funding 
Public Pensions: State-Local, Civil Service, and 
Military" mimeo (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
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higher current wages as the extent of under-
funding increases. Moreover, to the extent 
that public employers perceive their under-
funding to be "permanent." and not merely 
a way of shifting retirement system costs on 
to future generations of taxpayers, their net 
retirement system contributions will de-
crease and they should be "willing" to pay 
higher wages.18 Thus, the extent of under-
funding should be allowed to influence the 
magnitude of the public sector wage-pen-
sion benefits trade-off.14 
October 1977) and Tilove, Public Employee Pension 
Fitndst for a discussion of the funding problem. 
Although court decisions or constitutional require-
ments in some states (such as New York) forbid dimu-
nition ot pension rights, it is difficult to see how these 
requirements are enforceable it state legislatures re-
fuse to appropriate funds, if some political juris-
dictions shrink to the point lhat makes continual 
linancing of their retirement systems impossible, or 
if local governments also face statutory or constitu-
tional limits on their lax rates or debt ratios. Indeed, 
Phillip Dearborn, Pensions for Police and Firemen 
(Washington, D.C.: Labor Management Relations 
Service, 1974) notes that within the last fiften years, 
two cities— Hamntramack, Michigan, and Lakewood, 
Ohio—have been at times unable to make pension 
payments to retirees. Robert Tilove, Public Employee 
Pension Funds, and Aronson, "Projections of. . .," 
provide a more complete discussion of the possible 
relationship between underfunding of public retire-
ment systems and retirement benefit security. 
'This view of underfunding should be contrasted 
with that of Mumy, "The Economics of. . .," who 
treats underfunding as an intertemporal cost transfer, 
not as reflecting the probability ot nonpayment of 
benefits. 
"The argument in the text warrants elaboration: 
the actual ellect of underfunding on wages depends 
upon boih employers' and employees' perceptions, 
making a number of situations possible. First, em-
ployers may view underfunding as simply an inter-
temporal cost transfer, II this is the case, they would 
not be willing to offer higher wages in the event of 
underfunding and no wage-undertunding tradeoff 
would be observed. 
Second, employers may regard underfunding as 
cost saving, at least to the currently elected admin-
istration. This might occur if they arc unconcerned 
about future financial crises that may result (due to 
underfunding) after they leave office or if they believe 
higher levels of government would "bail-out" their 
retirement system if retirees ever faced possible non-
receipt of benefits. If underfunding reduces public 
employers' perceived costs ol pensions, this will in-
crease their willingness to pay higher wages; whether a 
wage-underfunding trade-oft actually exists, however, 
depends on employees' perceptions. 
It employees arc unaware of underfunding or be-
Company 
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Unfor tunate ly , accurate est imates of (he 
extent of underfunding of individual public 
sector retirement systems are scanty. How-
ever, even when funding data are not di-
rectly observable there is a way to "control" 
for the extent of underfunding in analyses 
of the trade-off. Elsewhere, I have presented 
a scries of models of public sector retirement 
systems and for each derived the observable 
determinants, or correlates, of the extent of 
retirement system funding.20 Ceteris pari-
bus, the extent of retirement system fund-
ing is seen in these models to vary directly 
with the ratio of retirement system assets to 
current benefit payments, the ratio of the 
number of local government employees to 
the nimil)cr of retirees receiving benefits, the 
ratio of the fraction of wages paid into the 
system by the employer and employees to 
the fraction of final wages received as retire-
ment benefits by retirees, with the real rate of 
return on retirement system assets, and with 
the retirement age. Hence, as each of these 
variables increases one would expect to 
observe public employees'wages decreasing 
if, in fact, the extent of funding is related to 
the probability ol receipt of promised retire-
ment benefits. 
The negative relationship between the 
reiiicmcnt age and wages observed in the 
previous section may well reflect the corre-
lation of the former with theextentof under-
funding. More confidence could be placed, 
Neve it will have MO effen on their expected retirement 
benefits, they will ignore under funding in their choice 
of employers and, ceteris paribus, be attracted to 
high-wage employers. Since employers who under-
fluid could (in the alwve case) afford to pay higher 
wages, one would expect 10 observe large-scale under-
funding predominating, as employers sought to pay 
high wages to attract municipal employees. In other 
words, one rmght observe near lotal under fund itig by 
.ill public employers and no wage-underfunding trade-
off. 
If employees are awaie of underfunding, however, 
and if they perceive it to reduce their expected benefits, 
iliey would demand higher wages to compensate them 
for the risks associated with underfunding. Employers 
with unfunded retirement systems would have to 
olfer higher wages to attract employees; thus, as un-
funded liabilities increased so would wages. Only in 
this situation, the one I focus on in the text, would 
one observe boih a |wsitive wage-under funding trade-
off and the coexistence of retirement systems in which 
funding practices vary widely. 
nSee Ehrenberg, "Correlates of Underfunding . . .". 
in this interpretation if the other correlates 
were also shown to influence public sector 
wages. Fortunately, data on them are avail-
able from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(ID?1!) for a subset of the retirement systems 
in my sample. These data were merged with 
data horn the two previous sources, thus 
permitting estimation of equations of the 
form 
(5) Wn = a,*aiXi*atRi 
where Fj represents the vector of observable 
correlates of the extent of retirement system 
underfunding, other than the retirement 
age. Estimates of the coefficients of these 
correlates (Fj) are found in Table 3. 
Perhaps due to the relatively small sample 
sizes, the coefficients tend to be statistically 
insignificantly different from zero.*1 When 
significant, however, they have the correct 
sign. An increase in the estimated rate of 
return on assets (F2) does tend to reduce 
wages, while an increase in the ratio of re-
tired system members to active system mem-
bers (Fs) does lend to increase wages,n Sim-
ilarly, an increase in annual benefits paid to 
each retired member in relation to the sys-
tem's annual receipts per active member (T )^ 
does tend to increase firefighters' wages as 
predicted. Each of these results is consistent 
with what we would expect if these variables 
were correlates of the extent of system under-
funding. 
While the results of this section are not 
totally unambiguous, they do support the 
view that these correlates are useful proxies 
for the extent of retirement system under-
funding. Furthermore, the extent of under-
funding doesappear to be related to employ-
ers' {and employees') perceptions of the 
probability that promised retirement bene-
fits will not be fully paid, and these per-
ceptions are reflected in compensating wage 
differentials.25 
11
 The inclusion of the funding variables (/•'} and the 
small sample sizes caused many of the coefficients of 
the retirement system variables {R) to become insig-
nificant. However, those that remained statistically 
significant had the same signs as they did in 'fable I. 
"The data unfortunately did not permit me to in-
clude unrealized capital gains in F^. 
"Elsewhere, my colleague, Robert S. Smith has 
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Table 3. The Impact of Retirement System Parameters on 
Uniformed Employees Earnings: Extent of Funding Coefficients." 
{standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent 
Vmiableb 
AD Systems 
]•', 
H 
h 
yt' 
*> 
n/TOF 
Unifoimcd Employ* 
' • i 
F.' 
F j 
F ; 
FJ 
n/DOF 
Potict 
It', 
,010 
(.0G5) 
.003 
(.005) 
.051 
(.0-10) 
.065 
(.0-19) 
.005 
(.018) 
66/41 
If, 
-.20!) 
(.058) 
-.003 
(.00-1) 
-.022 
(.035) 
-.010 
(,•130) 
-.026 
(.016) 
06/•!! 
.*<• Specific .System!! 
.350 
(.250) 
-.006 
(.018) 
.•105* 
(.135) 
-.207 
(.352) 
.013 
(.018) 
53/29 
.110 
(.160) 
-,012 
(.018) 
.258** 
(.134) 
- .059 
(.340) 
-.024 
(.018) 
53/29 
"' 1 
.083 
(,050) 
-.010 
(.018) 
,293* 
(.122) 
-.05-1 
(.048) 
.005 
(.018) 
75/50 
,084 
(.070) 
-.020 
(.OIK) 
.290* 
(.127) 
-.087 
(.177) 
.008 
(.017) 
62/38 
Fire fight 
IF» 
-.045 
(.050) 
- .034** 
(.018) 
,214** 
(.121) 
-.042 
(.048) 
-.010 
(.018) 
75/50 
-.075 
(.077) 
- .Ml* 
(.018) 
,230** 
1.128) 
-.062 
(.178) 
-.010 
(.018) 
62/38 
'et 
11', 
.053 
(.OS) 
.024 
(.022) 
.341* 
(.151) 
-.059 
(.060) 
.050* 
(.022) 
75/50 
.084 
(.104) 
.019 
(.025) 
,319** 
(.172) 
-.011 
(.024) 
.049* 
(.024) 
(ffi/SB 
A 
IF, 
-.075 
(.067) 
.005 
(.024) 
.2li2** 
(.161) 
-.047 
(.064) 
.030 
(.023)-
75/50 
- .076 
(.112) 
-.002 
(.027) 
.2(H) 
(.187) 
-.086 
(.260) 
.030 
(.020) 
62/38 
" Also includoi in rlicjiiialysiswcrciliosccxogcnoiisvai-utblcitfuniKl in 'L alilc I, as wcIF asilicltuionicMiii vurialtk-s 
[»i the nonrcjroriing of each of l lie In ruling proxies. 
{'Definitions of i" variables: 
f I = projjoition of llie retirement system's members covered by the social security system in 1977 
Fi = retirement system's realized earnings on investments divided by the retirement system's assets in 1971 
Fj = retirement system's retired members divided by its active members in 1971 
Ft - retirement system's assets divided by retirement system's animal benefit payments in 1971 
t \ •= retirement system's Iwnefii |mynw ins \xr retired memberdivided by ttsrcccipispci active member in 1971 
c
 Coefficient multiplied hy 100. 
•Significant at the .05 level with a two-tailed test. 
••Significant at the .10 level with a iivo-tailed test, 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Governments, Vol. 6, No, \, Employee Retirement Systems of 
State and Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: C.P.O., 1973). 
presented some more direct evidence on the trade-off 
between the extent ol under funding and municipal 
employees' wage rates in Pennsylvania. Sec Robert S. 
Smith, "Pensions, Underfutiding, and Wages in the 
Public Sector" mimeo (Cornell Univcisiiy, March 
1979). 
Empirical Analysis: 1974 - 75 Survey Data 
The data analyzed in the previous two 
sections, although supportive of llie view 
that a trade-off exists between public sector 
wages and retirement system characteristics, 
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contain information on only a limited setof 
retirement system characteristics, none of 
which would likely be affected by public 
sector pension reform legislation. More-
over, the data are restricted to police and 
firefighters. No information for other func-
tional categories of employees isp esented. 
To remedy these shortcomings, I now 
present analyses of data from the Inter-
national City Management Association's 
1974- 75 Survey of U.S. Municipality Em-
ployee Benefits {see U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, Third National Survey . . ., for a 
description). These data have the advan-
tages of containing a large number of ob-
servations, covering sanitation employees 
as well as police and firefighters, and con-
taining information on a much richer set of 
retirement system characteristics, Their 
disadvantages are that they do not contain 
data on either unionization or employees' 
contributions to the retirement system and 
that they contain data on average annual 
earnings, rather than minimum and maxi-
mum wage scales. Average earnings may 
differ across cities because of differences in 
the seniority structures of the cities' work 
forces, and the omission of important ex-
planatory variables, such as unionization 
and employee contributions, may bias the 
remaining coefficients. Nevertheless, be-
cause of the richer set of retirement system 
characteristics available, these data are a 
useful supplement lo those analyzed in the 
previous section. 
Table <1 presents estimates of variants of 
Equation 4 that utilize these data for a sam-
ple of cities over 25,000 in population for 
which data on the vector of variables X were 
available. Also included in the table in 
brackets are the implied coefficients from a 
canonical correlation analysis; I will return 
to these latter coefficients shortly. Unam-
biguous implications about the signs of 
several of the retirement system coefficients 
can be drawn and these are the variables 
upon which the discussion will center. 
Unlike with the earlier data, increases in 
the minimum regular retirement age (r,) 
are significantly positively related to wages 
for both police and firefighters here, as 
predicted. When overtime pay is included 
in average salary used lo calculate retire-
ment benefits (r9), it increases employers' 
net costs of providing pensions and should 
thus reduce wages. This in fact occurs for 
firefighters. Similarly, if the calculation of 
retirement benefits uses a higher percentage 
multiple for earnings above a fixed level 
(/,„), this should increase retirees' benefits 
and employers' costs, ceteris paribus, and 
reduce wages—which occurs forpolice. The 
existence of monthly deferred vested retire-
ment benefits for individuals who leave 
service prior to retirement (rl5) also in-
creases employers' costs of pensions and 
should, and does, lead to lower wages. All 
these results are consistent with the exist-
ence of a trade-off between wages and retire-
ment system characteristics. 
In contrast, many retirement system char-
acteristics one would expect to influence 
wage levels prove consistently to be insig-
nificant, For example, in a period of infla-
tion, or if wages increase with age, the 
smaller the number of years' salary used in 
the calculation of W*, the higher retirement 
benefits and employers' costs will be and 
hence the lower wages should be. Relative 
to the omitted category (W* equal to ihc 
final year's wage), the coefficients of r, (W* 
equal to a 3- or 5-year average) and rt (W* 
equal to a 10-year or career average) should 
therefore be positive. While in the main they 
are, the coefficients are never significant. 
Similarly, postretiremen! cost-of-living 
adjustments in retirement benefits should 
increase employers' net pension costs and 
lead them to pay lower wages, Yet coef-
ficients of that variable are all insignificant 
and as a result the variable does not even 
appear in Table 4, Finally, the fraction of 
average pay reiirees receive for normal re-
tirement (rn) i~ never significant," 
The insignificant coefficients of these 
retirement system characteristics may be 
due to collinearity among the various char-
acteristics. What is more disturbing is that 
increasing the number of years of service 
required for regular retirement ( r j leads toa 
reduction in wages, and the existence of 
"The equations reported in Tabic i use fractions of 
pay alter 25 years of service, Substitution of the trac-
tions after 15 or 35 years, or use ot all three fractions 
simultaneously Joes not alter this conclusion, 
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Table 4. The Impact of Retirement System Parameters 
on the Average Earnings of Uniformed Employees: 1975 Survey Data.' 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variables 
x„ 
X . ' 
X
"
S 
* 1 
x5 
Xf, 
*7 
' 1 
'•I 
rsc 
' r r 
r* 
>B 
'7 
r» 
.OJI* 
(.OH) 
.001* 
(.000) 
.316* 
(.115) 
.218* 
(.073) 
.28)' 
(.081) 
.293* 
(.031) 
.011 
(.028) 
- .036 
(.028) 
.031 
(.026) 
.189** 
(•113) 
- .324* 
(.155) 
.002 
(.002) 
,000 
(.003) 
.012 
(.033) 
.038 
(.035) 
P 
(.151)* 
\m\ 
1-029] 
(,B30| 
11.094) 
(1.002) 
(.050) 
(.197) 
(.»]] 
(.173! 
[ - . I l l | 
(.002) 
|.092| 
[•"041 
|.263) 
.050* 
(-012) 
.002* 
(.000) 
(.096) 
.221* 
(.062) 
.352* 
(.067) 
.363* 
(.976) 
,052* 
(.022) 
- .025 
(.022) 
.008 
(.021) 
.215* 
(.092) 
- . 5 0 1 * 
(•129) 
.001 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.022 
(.026) 
.022 
(.028) 
f 
(.262) 
(.SIS) 
(.022) 
(.622) 
(1.008) 
1-92*1 
| . I I0| 
(.075) 
[,042| 
(.205) 
(-.182} 
1 - .007) 
1,053) 
(.087) 
(.173) 
.053* 
(.022) 
.002* 
(.000) 
.213 
(.173) 
.215** 
(-110) 
.075 
(.121) 
.054 
(.136) 
.052 
(.041) 
-.022 
(.039) 
.024 
(.038) 
,252 
(.106) 
- .505* 
(.233) 
.004 
(.003) 
.002 
(.001) 
.035 
(.047) 
- .057 
(.051) 
FA 
(.330) 
(.486) 
(.403) 
(1.296) 
[.892] 
(.862] 
|.216| 
1-191) 
(.116) 
(.101) 
(-.0171 
[.075] 
(.237) 
(.162) 
[.293] 
.028 
(.024) 
.001 
(.000) 
-.075 
4-184) 
.277* 
(.115) 
.249** 
(.13?) 
.285** 
(.148) 
.041 
(.043) 
- .078** 
(.015) 
-.034 
(.012) 
-.034 
(.184) 
- .010 
(.198) 
- .000 
(.002) 
-.005 
(.006) 
- .007 
(.071) 
.017 
(.078) 
A" 
I.I89] 
| .28l | 
(.672) 
(1.839) 
[2.197] 
(2.090] 
[.007) 
[.099| 
[.274] 
] - . 207 | 
|.219| 
(120] 
(.058) 
[.087] 
[.825] 
u
'l1i? Xj are ckfirK-d as in Tabic I. In addition, 
P = police average earnings 
F « (ire average earnings 
FA - lire average earnings |wr 40 hour week 
S = sanitaliun average earnings 
and 
' l 
'2 
r3 
r t 
ri 
r6 
I =cmp1oyces covered by social security; 0=tioi covered 
l=cily retirement system; O^counly or stale system 
minimum age lor regular retirement if both age and service requirement exist; 0=odM>rwise 
minimum years of service (or regular retirement il boiri age and service requirement exist: 0=niltentise 
minimum ag.' (or regular reiiremem il only age requirement exists; Otherwise 
minimum years of service tor regular retirement il only service rec|trircnienl exists; 0=olltcrv.'ise 
l=iiormal retirement based on last 3 or 5 years average salary; 0=ot1ierwise 
l=normal retitcmeni based on career average or last 10 years average salary: Otherwise 
b[ ] ° implied coefficients from ilic canonical correlation analysts. 
^Coefficient and standard error have been multiplied by 100. 
'Significant at the .05 level with a two-tailed test. 
••Significant at (lie .10 level will) a two-tailed test. 
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Table •}. (Continued) 
t'liiiitblti 
'9 
no 
Mi 
fia 
Ui 
f|1 
Us 
Mi; 
fl7 
R' 
II 
J 
-.029 
asm 
- .082** 
-.016 
(.057) 
,oor> 
-.03H 
(•02») 
.055" 
(.031) 
.059* 
(.028) 
.050 
(.085) 
.DAS 
(.US) 
.521 
2S2 
ti 
(.000) 
[-.009| 
[ - 025| 
I - .066] 
I-.080] 
].I4I) 
| - . 0 I7 | 
[.aw] 
|.(XM] 
-.007+ 
(-02J) 
.043 
(,0S2) 
-.046 
(.017) 
.051** 
(.027) 
-.029 
(.020) 
.ON 
(.025) 
.022 
(.022) 
.103 
(.073) 
.170 
(.138) 
.623 
!«2 
F 
(-.1031 
|.08fi| 
(-.010) 
1.050] 
I-.0J3] 
[.Old] 
[-.055] 
[,235] 
|.07fi] 
FA 
- .067" 
(,0JS) 
(.058) 
-.07) 
(.086) 
.022 1 
(.018} 
».076* | 
(.036) 
.043 
(.055) 
-.023 | 
(.010) 
- .021 
(.135) 
-.117 | 
(2-18) 
.301 
262 
(.010) 
(.008) 
(.017) 
I-.078] 
i-,152] 
(.093) 
[-.3811 
(.045] 
[-,108] 
-.040 
(.042) 
-.052 
I.05U 
.074 
(.068) 
.oca 
(.0.5S) 
-.09H* 
(.042) 
,002 
(.045) 
-.046 
(.043) 
.023 
(.109) 
.161 
(.227) 
.105 
157 
S 
1.170) 
[.000] 
].006] 
j.512) 
j.005) 
].26!)| 
I-/180] 
I.-I6S] 
|.207) 
r(J 1=ov«timp |xiy included i'l tltf average sal;>ry iiscd to c;ikid;itc retirement benefits; 0»II«I iiM-liufcit 
r ,0 1=rnkulalkm of tclircinrni bclldiis use lu'gbci percentage multiple Jigainst i:arninjp a)xwe a fiml level: 0-<nl)Piwi«-
r | | l=retireiiKMM bendils aw rcdii™! by social security; O-rjilicrwiie 
r |2 1=mcmtli1y amiuily cxisls lor noiism-icc idaled disability; 0=otli«wi$c 
r
 M Hmmtlily (Weired vested retirement benefit! exist for lliosr leaving service prior Hi notm;il mucincm: 0=nltimvUe 
r | | 1 =inmitlily survivors' annuity exisis lot nunsmicc related deaths; O^ollierwise 
r |j Hump sum death benefit cxisls lor nonservicc related dealt); 0soi1ierwise 
r m 1=ditl nni irjMirt retirement Ixwtii k-vch; 0=ul1i«wist> 
r |7 tractionofaverage pay received for normal rctirwnwil afwr 2ft years o( service i( average aiiiiLialrairriiiKSMi'ii'SIO.MKI 
Sourer: U.S. I'ureau of the Census, /C?5 County «n<t Dry «n(n /tnoA (WasbiiiKUm, D.C.: G.P.O.. 1973). International City 
Management Association, 1971-75 Survey <>} U.S. MwiiafHiHty Hmfiloytf Henrfils (unpublished data file). 
cither monthly survivors' benefits (»•„) or 
lump-sum death benefits (r,s) for non-
service-related deaths leads to an increase in 
wages. Each of these variables' effects is 
opposite in sign to my prior expectation, 
based upon knowledge of their effects on 
employers' net pension costs, 
It is of course possible thai these param-
eter estimates are subject to simultaneous 
equations bias; many of the exogenous fac-
tors thai influence wages may also influence 
the reiiremcnt system characteristics. In the 
absence of a data set that is sufficiently rich 
to provide a set of variables thai can be used 
to identify a structural system in which 
wages and retiremenl system characieristics 
arc simultaneously determined, I adopt a 
second-best approach to try to control for 
this problem. Recall that we are estimating 
variants of Equation 4 and the slatistical 
problem is that the vector Rj may be corre-
lated with the error term Uj. Now if Equa-
tion 4 holds, it must be true that 
(6) (Wij-Wi)- « , (« / - f f ) = 
0)(Aj - X) + u, 
where the bars indicate the mean values of 
the variables in the sample, 
In this form, the vectors of parameters ot| 
and «2 can be estimated using canonical 
correlation analysis, Since the wage and 
reiiremcnt system characteristic variables 
are now on the "same side" of the equation, 
simultaneous equations bias should be 
eliminated. Moreover, as ihe parameters 
from canonical correlation analyses are 
unique only up to a multiple, we can nor-
malize the resulting coefficients, setting the 
Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
Copyright (c) Cornell University 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G, Retirement System Characteristics and Compensating Wage Differentials 
in the Public Sector, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 33:4(1980:July) p.470 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS / 
parameter of the deviation of the logarithm 
of earnings from iis sample mean (W,y -
W) equal to one so as to make the other co-
efficients comparable to the regression co-
efficients found in Table 4. Although there 
are no significance l<?sls for individual co-
efficients in canonical correlation analysis 
comparable to the Mesls of regression anal-
ysis, and the coefficients in this analysis 
cannot be given any structural interpreta-
tion, ihe magnitudes of the corresponding 
coefficients should suggest whether ihe 
estimates in Table 4 were subject to simul-
taneous equations bias. 
The bracketed coefficients in Table 4 are 
ihe implied coefficients from ihe canonical 
correlation analyses that correspond to the 
regression coefficients. The coefficients 
have been normalized by setting the wage 
coefficient equal to one and the signs re-
ported as if all variables other than the wage 
variable were on the right-hand side of ihe 
equation, In ihe main, when the retiremeni 
system variables were statistically signifi-
cant and of the correct sign before (r„ r9, 
r,0, and r„), ihe corresponding coefficient 
from the canonical correlation analyses is of 
approximately the same magnitude and of 
the same sign. In contrast, several of the re-
tirement system characteristics coefficients 
that were statistically significant and of the 
wrong sign before now are smaller in ab-
solute value (r<) or actually change sign 
(ri5). These results suggest that the coef-
ficients in Table 4 that had signs lhat 1 did 
not expect may well have been subject to 
simultaneous equations bias. However, 
until a richer data set that allows one lo 
build a more completemodel becomes avail-
able, no definitive conclusions can be 
reached on this point. 
Concluding Remarks 
The results presented in this paper sup-
port the proposition that, holding other 
variables constant, increases in uniformed 
employees' retirement system contributions 
lead to compensating increases in their 
salaries. They also support the hypothesis 
that, other things equal, more "generous" 
retirement system parameters are associated 
with salaries for police and firefighters that, 
if not completely compensating, are at 
Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and 
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least lower than would otherwise be ex-
pected. Finally, ihcy provide support for the 
view that ihe extent of retirement system 
underfunding is related to employers' 
and employees' perceptions of the proba-
bility that promised retirement benefits will 
not be fully paid, and that these perceptions 
are reflected in compensating wage differ-
entials, The evidence on the latter two 
points, however, is not totally unambig-
uous. 
Unfortunately, the retirement system 
parameters most likely to be affected by a 
public sector variant of ERISA (vesting 
rules, funding requirements, and standards 
for fiduciary responsibility) were not re-
jjorted in the several daia sets used in this 
paper. Hence, one cannol directly translate 
my results inlo definitive quantitative state-
ments about the effects of any proposed pub-
lic sector pension reform legislation. Never-
theless, my results do support ihe proposi-
tion lhat a irade-otf exists between wages 
and retirement system characteristics in the 
public sector and suggest that such legisla-
tion will likely have an impact on future 
levels of public sector wages. To the extern 
lhat fully compensating wage differentials 
do not exist, such legislation will also have 
an impact on public sector employment 
levels and the taxes needed to finance state 
and local public services. 
Clearly, additional studies should be 
undertaken in ihe future to improve the 
precision of my estimates of the trade-off, 
hopefully using data sets that permit one to 
establish parameters for retirement systems 
in a manner amenable to policy simula-
tions.2* If better data seis become available, 
one could ideally include other nonwagc 
compensation items in the analysis and also 
estimate the wage-nonwage compensation 
trade-off in the context of a more complete 
structural model of the implicit market for 
nonwage compensation, as discussed in 
Shcrwin Rosen's "Hedonic Price..." paper, 
"Robert S. Smiih and 1 had ho|ied to analyze die 
claia thai undcrly U.S. House of Representatives, 
Pemion Task Force Report, which contain unpub-
lished information on funding and vesting provisions. 
Unfortunately, ihe House Subcommittee which col-
lected the data decided in May 1978 to keep it con-
fidential and formally refused to grant us access to ii. 
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